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NOT SO DIFFERENT: TANGIBLE, INTANGIBLE,
DIGITAL, AND ANALOG WORKS
AND THEIR COMPARISON
FOR COPYRIGHT PURPOSES
Prof 1 Trotter Hardy·

I. ABSTRAC"(

Commentators on intellectual property rights• often assert that intangible
intellectual property is inherently different from tangible property, and that
intangible works in digital formats2 are inherently different from the same
sort of works in non-digital, or "analog,''3 formats. 4 For example, the fact
that "information is a public good" is often used to explain why different
policies should apply to information and to tangible objects-given that the
latter are not public goods.' Others wonder whether, because digital works

• Professor, William and Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, Virginia. My thanks to Professor
Robert Kreiss of the University of Dayton School of Law for including me in the conference from
which this symposium issue ofthe University of Dayton Law Review is derived, and to the audience
and other participants at the conference who offered helpful commentary. I also thank Walter Echwald
for critical editing assistance. In fact, I'd like to blame him for anything that is wrong in the article,
but I don't suppose I can do that.
1
I use the terms "intellectual property" and "copyright" more or less synonymously. To the
extent that the difference matters, I mean "copyright" as I will not discuss patents, trademarks, or trade
secrets directly.
2
"Digital form" or "digital materials" means information that is recorded and processed by a
computer, computer software, digital photography, or by word processing and the like.
3
"Non-digital" or "analog format" means information recorded in a way that does not require a
computer for playback-like audio cassette tapes, books, and film photography, for example.
4
See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 675 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, Does it Malter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 7 I 5 ( 1993); Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1036-37, 1042-43 (1998); Pamela Samuelson, Information as
Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?,
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 26-32.
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are cheap and easy to copy, Congress should abandon any effort to protect
them with a legal regime, but should instead leave the issue as one for
"self-help" in the form of encryption, password-restricted or subscription
access, advertising support, or the like, even though non-digital works
might continue to be subject to legal protection from copyright law.6
On a more general level, arguments asserting these differences are put
forward as a justification for certain conclusions about the appropriate
policies for either or both "Intangible intellectual property" and "digital
intellectual property." In particular, the assumption of sharp differences
often underlies arguments that Congress must balance the interests of
copyright producers and copyright consumers to an extent much greater
than that called for in regard to tangible property or non-digital property.
These assumptions of differences are wrong. For the purposes of
intellectual· property rules and regimes, there are no differences between
intangible and tangible property; nor are there any differences between
digital and non-digital materials. Consequently, although arguments for a
congressional balancing of copyright interests can certainly be made, such
arguments must be supported on grounds other than the assumption of such
differences.
II.

INTRODUCTION

Noted Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow once observed that
digital storage and processing is not just new, but is "profoundly new." 7
He seemed to be saying that because digital works exhibit a profound
difference from non-digital works, these differences either have or should
have a substantial impact on the laws surrounding intellectual property
protection of digital materials.
He is not alone in this observation, as one hears much the same thing
time and time again in informal conversations as well as in scholarly
commentary.8 But perhaps we should not take such assertions at face

6

See. e.g., Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, Wnu::o, July 1995 at 136-37; Roger ParlofT, Newbies
vs. Netwits, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Sept. 2000; Robin Peek, The Digital Rights Management
Dilemma: Copyright on the Internet, INFORMATION TODAY, Nov. I, 2000, at 50; Bruce Schneier, The
Fallacy of Trusted Client Software, INFORMATION SECURITY, Aug. 2000.
7
See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRJ::D, Mar. 1994, available at
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr;html>.
8
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Innovation and the Information Environment: New Wine Bursting
From Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 15 OR. L. REV. 257
(1996) (noting the difference that networked digital technology makes on concepts of joint
authorship); Barbara Cohen, Note, A Proposed Regime for Copyright Protection on the Internet, 22
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 401, 405 (1996) (stating "[t]he existing copyright regime, however, originally
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value, but rather should ask: What is it about digital materials that make
them so profoundly new and different?
And, if we are going to look at that question, we might as well step back
a little further and look at another widely held assumption about any form
of"intellectual property," whether digital or not-namely that "intellectual
property" and "tangible property" are inherently different, and hence
justify substantially different treatment by our legal system. Since the
latter question is broader than the former, it makes sense for me to address
the broader one first.
Ill.

TANGIBLE VERSUS INTANGIBLE PROPERTY

Everyone seems to think that "intellectual property" and "~ngible
property" are different. The same John Perry Barlow also observed in a
widely quoted article in Wired Magazine that: "[t]he central economic
distinction between information and physical property is that information
can be transferred without leaving the possession of the original owner. If
I sell you my horse, I can't ride him after that. If I sell you what I know,
we both know it. " 9
Well-known copyright scholar, author, and Stanford University Law
Professor, Paul Goldstein put it this way:
A loafofbread, once eaten, is gone. But 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' once sung and
heard, is still available for someone else to sing and to hear. Countless fans
can listen to the song, indeed copy it, without diminishing its availability to
anyone else who wants to sing or listen to or copy it. 10

Another noted American thinker, Thomas Jefferson, said much the same
thing, much earlier: "[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at
mine, receives light without darkening me." 11

created for works in print, will not be effective''); Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565,
577 ( 1996) (referring to the application of copyright to digital materials causing "a dramatic extension
of and contravention of the policies underlying the copyright holder's rights in nondigital contexts");
Douglas J. Masson, Fixation on Fixation: Why Imposing Old Copyright Law on New Technology Will
Not Work, 71 IND. L.J 1049, 1063 (1996). Cf Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer
Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L: REv. 981 (1996) (worrying about the
opposite problem, that digital technologies such as "copyright management systems" represent a
profound change in what publishers can learn about readers).
9
Barlow, supra note 7, at •7.
10
PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 16
(1994).
11
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington ed. 1903)).
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The point of all of these statements, particularly Barlow's, is to show
that intellectual property laws restrict---<>r we might say, "monopolize"what would otherwise be the "shareable" quality of information} 2
Tangible property, like horses and bread, in contrast, are not by nature
"shareable" in this way.
I!Dplicit in Barlow's observation is the notion that intellectual property
laws are something of an affront to the ordinary workings of the world:
after all, if tangible property is not naturally shareable, then personal
property laws simply confirm and are consistent with this natural order and
hence are easily tolerated. But if information is naturally shareable, then
intellectual property laws get in the way of that natural order, and hence are
less readily tolerated.
This thinking is wrong.

A. Ground Rules
To see why it is wrong, we need some ground rules. First, when I talk
about differences or similarities between tangible property and intellectual
property, or between digital and non-digital works, I am talking only about
differences that are meaningful for our legal system and particularly for
copyright law. There may be many differences between a toothbrush and a
furnace, or a sailboat and a shoelace, for example, but we do not think that
those differences-size, shape, color, function etc.-are relevant for
purposes of the law of personal property ownership. All those items are
subject to about the same type of property ownership rules-they can all be
. bought, sold, lent, stolen, rented, leased, bequeathed, etc.
Similarly, when I discuss the differences between "tangible" property
and "intellectual" or "intangible" property, I am not saying that one could
not possibly find or describe any differences whatsoever between those
things-I am only talking about whether there are any differences that
matter or should matter to the way that our legal system treats both things
for purposes of rights, ownership, licensing, rental, "theft" (infringement),
bequests, and the like.
Second-and perhaps less obvious-it will be helpful for me to
establish as another ground rule what my starting presumption is about
how decisions concerning things like tangible property or intellectual
property are made. By this, I refer to whether such decisions are by default

12
In this article, I use the tenn "infonnation" in the very broad sense of any sort of"content" like
music, poetry, art works, stories, computer software, plays, motion pictures, etc.
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made either "collectively," or "individually." Put more conventionally, the
question is whether we start thinking about a given issue as something that
would normally be a matter for public resolution through some form of
governmental process, or whether it would be normally a matter for private
decision-making.
The reason to clarify. this starting presumption is that doing so
establishes a burden of proof. If one's starting presumption is that
decisions about some issue "X'.' are to be made collectively, then the
burden of demonstrating that they ought to be made individually falls on
those who would urge that result, and good justifications need to be offered
for why the normal default rules of collective decision-making should not
apply. Conversely, if one's starting presumption is that decisions ~bout "X"
are to be made privately, then the burden of justification falls on those who
would argue the contrary, namely that decisions ought to be made
collectively.
At the extremes, these starting presumptions might be equated with the
extreme ends of a political spectrum. "Collective" decision-making for all
things implies a thoroughly fascist government or perhaps an absolute
monarchy; whereas ''private" decision making for all things implies a state
of no government, or anarchy. Obviously, no extant society falls at the
extremes, and all societies exist with a mix of both collectively-made and
individually made decisions. Moreover, the question of what is the "best"
starting presumption is a fascinating one worthy of much thoughtful
analysis.
· Happily, however, we need not delve into political philosophy to
ascertain what the starting presumption is in the United States, at least for
the federal government. By history, tradition, and the structure of our
Constitution, the starting presumption about any issue is that decisions
concerning that issue are to be made individually. Only to the extent that
there is a good reason to do so would decisions be put in the hands of a
collective decision-making process such as that of Congress. I do not
propose to provide an elaborate justification for this observation, other than
to note that the Constitution establishes a federal government of
enumerated powers-a starting presumption that decisions are to be made
privately (or at the state level through state governments), 13 with the burden

13

I will only look at the federal level of collective decision-making, as copyright law is
exclusively a matter of federal law. If Congress establishes a rule about compulsorY licensing, for
example, it would not be within a state's power to say. that compulsorily licensed parties must
nevertheless bargain with an owner to reach a voluntary agreement about license fees. Similarly, if
Congress establishes a "rule" that authors and publishers are allowed to bargain to whatever royalty
rate they can reach agreement on, a state would not be free to establish a compulsorY royalty rate. In
short, at least for copyright law, the alternatives seem to be that a given decision will either be made by
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of justification falling on those who would argue that some particular issue
should be a matter for the federal government to decide.
Notwithstanding the initial presumption that individuals can "do what
they want," an enormous number of decisions in our society are indeed
made collectively, through the democratic process. So as a general matter,
the "burden" of justifying collective decision-making seems frequently
quite easy to satisfy. Nonetheless, as all lawyers know, it can matter very
much who bears the burden of proof on an issue, so I note here that my
reasoning about intangible property starts with the presumption that
decisions about intangible property-like other decisions-should be made
privately, unless there is some good justification for placing those
decisions in public hands. (Those who share this presumption may or may
not agree with my reasoning and conclusions from that starting point; but
those who do not share even the initial presumption will most assuredly not
agree with any of what follows.)
A presumption of individual, not collective, decision-making about
intellectual property means, of course, that we should begin our thinking
with the premise that there should be no collective decisions about
intellectual property whatsoever. That is, that there should be no
intellectual property law, no copyright law, at all.
This· is not a specious or manifestly bizarre assumption. Indeed, one can
read many popular expressions of this viewpoint in the press, especially in
the computer trade press, and especially in regard to digital works. Many
computer aficionados ("hackers?") argue that digital works should have no
copyright protection. 14 The notion is that if creators are able to protect such
works with, say, encryption, then that is what they should do. And if they
are unable to reliably restrict access and copying, through the use of
encryption or other technologies, or contractual or "business-model"
me~ns-well, that's too bad; they should not tum to the law for help. 15
.

Congress, or else it will be made privately. There is little, if any, room for the alternative of a
collective decision made at the state level.
14
See Brian Martin, Against Intellectual Property (visited Dec. S, 2000) <http://danny.oz.au/freesoftwarefadvocacy/against_IP.html>; JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY (1996); Peter Drahos, Decentring
Communication: The Dark Side of Intellectual Property, in FREEOOM OF COMMUNICATION 249, 274
(Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 39-42 (1989); Laurie Steams, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process.
Property and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REv. 513 (1992); David Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: Of
Myths and Paradoxes, 69 CANADIAN BAR REV. 98-128 (1990).
15 Sometimes this position is identified as the libertarian position on intellectual property. See
Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
II: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (hereinafter
II ENCYC. L. & ECON.). I am not a member of either the libertarian or the anarchist parties, and so
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Whether one agrees with this position or not, it does represent nicely the
starting presumption about intellectual property. That starting point, in
tum, implies that the burden falls on those who (like me) argue that there
should be some government involvement in decisions about intellectual
property in the form of intellectual property laws.
One of the principal arguments, at least for a threshold minimum
amount of intellectual property protection, is straightforward. It .is the
familiar argument one that, without some form of corrective mechanism,
intellectual creations would exhibit a high degree of "market failure.'' 16 A
"market failure" means that unless something is done to fix things, people
will produce either too much or too little of some good or service, where
"too much or too little" are defined in relation to what would be the
optimal use of society's resources.
Another term for this sort of market failure is to say that some goods or
services exhibit "externalities," which can be either "positive" or
"negative.'' A "negative externality" has a bad effect on people who are
not involved in a voluntary market transaction with the source of the bad
effect. Pollution is a good example. If people who live downwind or
downriver from a polluting factory are stuck with pollution whether they
like it or not,. then the factory creates a "negative externality" for those
people.
More importantly for our purposes, "information products," in direct
contrast to pollution, seem to exhibit "positive externalities." If people are
able to copy and read or use other people's novels, or watch their movies,
or listen to their music, without engaging in a market transaction with the
author, then those people receive positive benefits from the author's
efforts, but the author does not. That is more-or-less what Barlow (and
Jefferson) and others are talking about. If someone sells you a match and
you use it to light a candle, others can take advantage of that same original
match by lighting their candles from yours. Every additional person who
gets a light from your candle is indirectly getting a benefit from the
original sale of the match to you. 17

speak for neither. It seems to me, however, that the ''no laws at all" argument about copyright is much
less a libertarian than it is an anarchist position.
16
Other arguments besides "market failure" can be made for intellectual property laws, of course,
including the "natural law" argument that authors already have a natural right to their creations and
Congress can only recognize that right. In my experience, though, the market failure argument is the
one most commonly put forward today in thoughtful discussions of the fundamental reasons for having
a body of intellectual property rights, and it is only that argument that I address here.
17
I am describing the situation of positive externalities in a way that will, I hope, sound familiar.
I refrain from analyzing at this point the harder question of whether the production of matches per se
has positive externalities, or whether it is only the "act of allowing others to light their candles from
yours" that has positive externalities; or whether the best characterization of the situation is something
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The fact that those other people are getting a light constitutes a "positive
externality" that flows from the original match producer's sale of a match.
The positive benefit is "external'' to the match producer because the
producer does not derive any benefit from a market transaction with those
who light their candle from yours.
Readers who are not familiar with this sort of thinking may be led to
conclude that positive externalities are a "good thing" that should be
encouraged, not something that needs to be "overcome" or "corrected."
This is an understandable reaction, but it is precisely the opposite of the
view expressed in this essay. The difference between the instinctive
reaction and the view of this article can easily be explained, however. The
instinctive view that "positive externalities" are a good thing is an "ex
post" view. That is, if one assumes that the activity or product with
external benefits has already been produced, then one will want that
activity or product to be shared. But the economic viewpoint-which is
one of the essential justifications for intellectual property law, often
referred to as the need for "incentives"--ofthis article is "ex ante." 18 That
is, the problem with goods or services showing positive externalities has
nothing to do with sharing after production; it has everything to do with the
concern either that no one will create or produce such goods in the first
yet again. For one thing, candle lighting-if we mean that activity literally-takes place in a small
scale, face-to-face situation, where the initial candle owner could, if -he or she chose to do so, charge
others for the privilege of getting a light. Moreover, since the match producer sells to the match buyer,
presumably the match producer could contractually limit the buyer's ability to offer a light to others
from a match-lighted candle, or charge a licensing fee based on the expected number of such lightings.
But in the text for now, I only want to illustrate the general proposition that some activities can benefit
third parties who are not in a contractual transaction with the original benefactor. I recognize the
existence of, but do not delve into, these other intricacies.
18

Copyright commentators frequently assess intellectual property incentives from the ex post
perspective, which is fundamentally contrary to the underlying reason for having intellectual property
laws in the first place. Professor Mark Lemley, for example, observed that" ...granting exclusive
rights [in intellectual property] raises the cost of new works to the public, and in some cases means
that the public won't get access to the works at all." Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 81 CAL. L. REv . .Ill, 124 (1999). To the same effect,
about 150 years earlier, was Thomas Macaulay's comment: "[c)opyright is a monopoly, and produces
all the effects which the general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly. The effect of monopoly
generally is to make articles scarce, to make them ·dear... " OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RJGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 189 (1986)
(hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RlGHTS) (quoting THOMAS MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON
COPYRIGHT (1841 )). These sorts of comments are manifestly incorrect. If the intellec~ual property
laws are working properly (a big "if' to be sure), they bring about the creation of works that would
otherwise not have been created. If intellectual property law protects works that would otherwise not
have been created, then the commentators are giving us the wrong comparison. We should be
comparing the cost of new works that are created under a regime of exclusive rights, to the complete
absence of such works under a regime of no exclusive rights. Because the cost of accessing nonexistent works is infinite, an intellectual property regime that brings works into existence sharply
lowers their cost.
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place, or that they will produce them in too little quantity and variety. If
potential producers (creators, authors, etc.) know ahead of time that they
will not be paid for the value that others receive from those goods and
services, they will not be encouraged to create as much as they would
otherwise. From that perspective, then, "positive externalities" are in fact a
"bad thing" that we would prefer to overcome or eliminate in order to
induce a more desirable level of output of those goods and services. (Of
course, in today's world, it may be that the benefit of being able to light a
candle from a neighbor's candle is so negligible that it is not enough of a
positive externality to worry about; we are much more likely to worry
about movies, television, software, and books.)
The familiar conclusion to these observations about positive and
negative externalities is this: polluters, recognizing that they will not have
to pay the cost of polluting those who are downriver, will produce "too
much" pollution-that is, more than is optimal for society's well being.
And, conversely, authors, recognizing that they will not get paid for the
benefits that others receive from reading their novels (or watching their
movies, or listening to their songs) will produce too few works of
authorship-that is, fewer than society would find to be optimal.
The purpose of anti-pollution laws is therefore to correct the negative
externality, to force polluters to bear the cost of their pollution (in the form
of fines or having to pay the cost of pollution avoidance)-to internalize
what would otherwise be an external cost of their activities. By forcing
polluters to internalize the costs of pollution, we can help to bring the
amount of pollution back down to a more socially desirable level.
The purpose of intellectual property laws-that is, the justification for
not just leaving all intellectual property decisions to private hands-is to
allow authors to receive the benefits of their authorship in the form of
license fees, royalties, and sales, etc.-to internalize what would otherwise
be the external benefits of their creative efforts. By giving authors a way
to internalize the benefits of their creativity, we can help to bring the
amount of authorship back up to a more socially desirable level. 19
Observing that activities have externalities and. that the creation of
property rights can overcome those externalities does not imply that one
must adopt property rights as the specific corrective mechanism. One can
choose not to correct externalities at all, for one thing. Or one can choose
to overcome the negative externalities of pollution, say, by not conferring

19

See PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT§ 1.14 (2d ed. 1997) (stating"(c)opyright law presupposes
that, absent subsidy, authors and publishers will invest sufficient resources in producing and
publishing original works only if they are promised property rights that will enable them to control and
profit from their works' dissemination in the marketplace.").
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property rights in "clean air," but rather by setting a governmentestablished limit on pollution output. Similarly, one can choose to
overcome the positive externalities of authorship not· by creating
intellectual property rights but rather by using government grants or direct
funding of authorship.
Many arguments can be made over the best ways to overcome particular
externalities. I will make only two brief arguments here. First, when a
"property rights" approach is feasible, it is usually thought to cost less and
to be more economically efficient than a "direct regulation" approach. 20
Second, reliance on property rights is consistent with the starting
presumption that individuals should make decisions, rather than the
collectivity. This is true because after the establishment of a property
regime, which is itself the result of a collective decision, subsequent
decisions about that property can be made individually; whereas in a
regulatory regime, the on-going operations, of pollution, authorship, or
whatever is regulated, continue to require collective decision-making.
Most commentators agree, at this first very general step, that the burden
of proving a justification for the government's involvement at all in
intellectual property is satisfied by the general observation that without that
involvement, intellectual creations would have significant external benefits
and would therefore not be created in enough quantity and variety to satisfy
society's demand. 21 Interestingly enough, at least at this first threshold
level, this justification for intellectual property laws is much the same as
that for tangible real property laws. 22 I will not go through all the steps
here, but many general theories of property postulate that without any sort
of property ownership, we would experience the "tragedy of the
commons."23 Tangible resources, absent any property rights (or other
20

See generally, David A. Rice, Public Goods. Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543,
544 (1992) (stating "[a)bsent market imperfections, it is generally assumed that competition will
efficiently allocate resources") citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS,
549-52, 562 (13th ed. 1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
21
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1992); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 15 TEX. L. REv. 989, 993-95 ( 1997); J.H. Reichman, From
Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. II, 22-23 (1997) (worrying that market failures in information goods can be over
compensated by too-strong legal protection, but not questioning the essential problem of market
failure); Rice, supra note 20, at 544-45.
22

See I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. 7,-, 36
(Dec. 5, 2000) <hnp://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/hardy.html>.
23
See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62
J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 152 SCI. 1243, 1244
(1968). Interestingly, some authority suggests that a real village commons would not suffer such a
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limitations)24 would be used inefficiently; people would under-plant and
under-fertilize the land, so that "usable" land, that is, land with crops or
vegetables or grains etc., would be under-produced. To put this in terms
that are more analogous to the "positive externalities" earlier described, we
might say that without the ability to exclude others from obtaining their
farm output, farmers would involuntarily confer external benefits on
others, which in tum would mean that farmers would have too little
incentive to produce crops in the fir~t place, just as authors would have too
little incentive to produce works of authorship.
Finally, these same general justifications also support the government's
creation of personal property rights, not just real property rights. The
concern is once again that craftspeople~ manufacturers, and the like would
under-produce goods if they were not able to sell those goods to others.
Creating property rights in such objects of production is the primary means
by which such people are able to have something to sell.
So it turns out that one of the principle justifications for creating a law
of real property ownership is largely equivalent to the justification for
creating personal property ownership and-more important for our
purposes-largely equivalent to the justification for creating a law of
intangible property ownership as well. It is the correction of a market
failure, and specifically the market failure associated with activities that
would otherwise confer positive external benefits and hence be underproduced relative to the socially desirable Ievel. 25
B. Information as a Public Good
The foregoing views are relatively uncontroversial among copyright
commentators, but it is from this point on that opinions begin to differ and
confusion arises. One reason for the differing of opinions is that copyright

tragedy, in part because the small size of a village implies that individuals must deal with each other
face-to-face in many contexts, and thereby have sufficiently lowered transaction costs to be able to
"contract" around the otherwise waste of the commons. See Boudewijn Bouckaert, Original
Assignment of Private Property, in II ENCYC. L. & ECON., supra note 15, at I, 8 and sources cited
therein.
24

See supra text accompanying note 20.
Not all scholars agree that the same justification underlies all three forms of property
protection. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, lntellectutil Property and Code, II ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COI\!MENT. 635, 638 (1996) (" ...while we protect real property to protect the owner from harm, we
protect intellectual property to provide the owner sufficient incentive to produce such property."). The
trouble with this reasoning is that it is circular: there is no "harm" that could come to real property
"owners" if we had no concept of real property ownership in the first place.
25

2001]

NOT SO DIFFERENT

223

commentators also widely share the view that "infonnation'026 exhibits a
special kind of positive externality: information is often called a "public
good."27
·
A "public good" in economic terms is something (the "something" can
either be a "good" in the literal sense of an "object," or more generally, a
good or a service or an activity) that has two characteristics. First, the
marginal cost of supplying one more customer with the good is zero-it is
costless. Second, there is no practical way, no "market-transaction" way,
to stop people from becoming non-paying customers even if the provider of
the good might prefer otherwise.28 Because the producer of the good
cannot exclude them, there will be a lot of non-paying consumers who are
therefore considered "free riders" on the producer of the good.
Examples of one-hundred percent pure "public goods" are rare, but a
commonly used one is "national defense." The thinking goes this way: if
someone were initially to supply "national defense" as a good in the
marketplace in the form of armies, navies, missiles, tanks, etc., then all
people within the national borders would re~eive the benefit of that
defense. If one additional person were born or immigrated into the nation,
then that person would also derive a benefit from the system of defense
without imposing a single extra penny of extra cost on the supplier.
Moreover, if "national defense" were supplied by the marketplace, the
supplier would want to charge a price to all those who benefited from it,
but the supplier would find it very difficult as a practical matter to get any
one "customer" to pay the price. Why would you "buy" your own national
defense if others were buying it already, since what others buy confers the
full benefit on you?

26

Again, I use the tenn "infonnation" here as a synonym for "intellectual property" or "works of
authorship" or "intangible property" etc., but without intending to imply that "property" rights are or
are not appropriate.
27
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTEllECTUAl PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 12-18 (2d ed. 2000); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PuBLIC GooDS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (1971); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II ENCYC. L.
& EcoN., supra note IS at 189, 191 (referring to infonnation as a "quasi-public good"); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis· of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUDIES 325, 326
(1989) ("A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its 'public goods' aspect."); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 971 (1990), reprinted in RICHARD H. CHUSED, A
COPYRIGHT ANTHOLOGY: THE TECHNOLOGY FRONTIER 2, 4 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283, 339 (1996), reprinted in CHUSED,
supra at 452, 455; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Work.s in Digital Form: The Implications ofSony, Galoob, and Sega, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993),
reprinted in CHUSED, supra at 346-47.
28
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610.13 (1982).
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Another example of a public good is "the English language" (at least in
English-speaking countries). 29 Even if someone or some entity could be
identified as the "owner" of the language, it would be impractical for that
owner to charge, each additional speaker of the language a fee for the
privilege of using the language; moreover, the addition of more speakers
would not impose any additional costs on existing speakers or on the
"owner" of the language. Similarly, "lighthouses" are often cited as
examples of public goods. Lighthouse keepers would find it difficult, as a
practical manner, to impose a charge on ships at sea that might take
advantage of their light. And, as with additional speakers of the English
language, the marginal cost of one more ship seeing the lighthouse light
and taking advantage of its cautions would be zero.
The essential point ~hind this categorization of goods or services as
"public goods" is this: public goods exhibit a market failure and the market
failure is one of "positive external benefits;" but an internalization of those
externalities through property rights is unlikely to be successful precisely
because of the characteristic that the supplier of public goods cannot find a
practical (i.e., cost-effective) way to charge customers for the good. And
finally, if there were a way to charge for the good, the right price would be
set at the marginal cost of supplying one more customer-by definition,
that marginal cost is zero, so that economic efficiency would dict.ate a zero
price, and it is unlikely that anyone would bother to supply a good at the
"right" price of ''nothing." A frequent conclusion from these observations
is that the market failures of public goods can only effectively be overcome
by government provision of the goods. 30 Indeed, the government is the
provider of many such goods, including national defense and lighthouses,
at least historically, and even today the government provides much of our
coastal navigation system such as charts, buoys, and the like.
The fact that "information" is a public good in this very same sense is a
pervasive theme in writings on copyright. Professor Paul Goldstein
seemed to be referring to this phenomenon when he described the
difference between eating a loaf of bread and singing a song, for example. 31
I suspect that if asked about it, both Professor Goldstein and Mr. Barlow (I
express no opinion about Thomas Jefferson) would be in substantial
agreement that the notion of "public goods" goes a long way toward
characterizing the fundamental issue of intellectual property protection,

29

I thank Professor Sarah Stafford of the William and Mary Economics Department for bringing
the "English language" example to my attention.
30 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAw AND ECONOMICS IN ANUTSHELL 49 (1995).
31
See supra text ac~mpanying note 10. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at§ 1.14 (stating
"(a)n unlimited number of users can consume a work without depleting it").
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and that this notion is what helps to distinguish the issue from that of the
protection of tangible property. Tangible property, after all, does not seem
to be a public good. If we think about toothbrushes, for example, the
marginal cost of supplying one more customer with a toothbrush is not
zero. It may not be "high," but it includes some costs for production and
distribution that are more than "nothing." Moreover, ready and practical
methods are in place for requiring each additional customer to pay for a
toothbrush: customers have to go into a store where they will deal with
clerks, cash registers, security procedures to prevent theft, etc.
This view, that information is a public good whereas tangible things are
not, informs a great deal of thinking about intellectual property. And it
leads to the view that this very difference has important public policy
consequences, more or less along these lines: Congress should keep firmly
in mind three facts. ( l) Information is a public good. (2) Every additional
form of intellectual property protection, every increase in the scope or
number of intellectual property rights, is a restriction on information
sharing. (3) Because the marginal cost of such sharing is zero, the right
price for that additional customer should be zero, whereas any additional
intellectual property protections imply a non-zero price and therefore serve
to prevent the socially desirable outcome. In short, many commentators
urge us to remember that because information is a public good, Congress
should keep the legal restrictions on information--the intellectual property
laws--as narrow as possible.
This view turns reasoning on its head.
To see why, we need to explore in more detail the notion that something
either is, or is not, a "public good." That notion rests on the more
fundamental premise that "public goodness" is a binary, all-or-nothing
quality. But that this premise makes no sense: marginal costs, after all, can
be "large" or "small" or anywhere in between. The "practicality" of
excluding individual buyers from the use of a good can vary on a
continuum, from "easy-and-almost-costless to exclude" to "really-hardand-would-cost-a-small-fortune to exclude" or anywhere in between.
Marginal costs and practicality are not like "weight" or "mass" that are
largely immutable characteristics. Yes it is true that national defense is
very much a public good. It benefits the whole nation. Perhaps it makes
sense to say that it is a "pure" public good.
A local radio broadcast, however, is something of a public good, but not
"as much" of one as "national defense." Radio broadcasts have substantial
public good attributes: the marginal cost of supplying one more listener
seems to be zero; radio stations would find it impractical to charge each
such additional listener a fee for listening. On the other hand, for local
radio broadcasts there is a limit to how many additional customers can
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enjoy the benefits of a broadcast: if they live too far away, the signal will
not reach them. Or the radio station could reduce the strength of its signals
and thereby exclude certain would-be listeners. Consequently, the element
of "distance" from the station might serve as a means of "exclusion" of
some customers from being beneficiaries. In that way, perhaps groups of
neighbors roughly equidistant from a radio station might band together and
pay a subscription fee to the station to cause it to increase its signal
strength. Of course, there are transaction costs to doing that and there are
free rider problems at the neighborhood level. But if we confine ourselves
to "local radio broadcasts" in a small town, it seems likely that the
transaction costs and free rider problems are far less than those that would
apply in the national context of national defense. One finds it hard to
imagine that the U.S. Army could extend private subscription pricing to an
entire nation, based on the belief that the nation's people could band
together and come up with the money on a private, purely voluntary basis.
It is far easier to imagine that sort of thing happening with a local radio
station and a small town community. 32
By "far easier to imagine," I really mean that it is more practical for a
radio station to overcome its public goods nature than for the provider of
national defense to overcome that same characteristic, and as a
consequence, I mean that it makes sense therefore to describe a local radio
station as "less" of a public good than national defense. Or in short, that
"public goodness" is a matter of degree, not something that is all or
nothing.
Once we see that public goodness is a matter of degree, we are led to ask
the question, what factors affect that matter of degree? What factors in
general make one thing more or less of a public good than some other
thing?
With radio stations, we identified "distance" as being relevant to that
outcome. The greater the distance a listener is from the radio station, the
more that listener is excluded from the benefit. Putting that observation
into more economic terms would lead us to characterize "distance" as a
kind of cost. If potential listeners wanted to spend enough money, they
could move closer to the radio station and hear the signal. Or they could
buy a big antenna and put it up on the roof to pick up more distant signals,
another type of cost. Or they could pay a friend who lived closer to the
station to pick up signals and transmit them over a phone line, yet another

32
Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 14 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988), reprinted in MAXWELL L STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PuBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 671, 678 (1997) (stating: "(t)he free rider
problem is most acute for large groups... [and] less acute for small groups.... ").
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kind of cost. An out-of-pocket "cost to gain access," in other words, is one
thing that seems relevant to the notion of exclusion from access.

C. Technological Change
Other things can affect the ease or difficulty of a supplier's ability to
exclude or charge customers for access besides out-of-pocket costs.
Changes in the state of technology can also have that effect. We can think
about one of our other commonly cited examples of public goods,
lighthouses, in this regard. The idea behind the lighthouse example is that
if each individual boat owner were asked to subscribe to a lighthouse's
services, the lighthouse service industry would either go out of business or
operate at too low a level of activity-as potential beneficiary-subscribers
hold back, waiting to be free riders on other subscribers.JJ
Look at how easily this picture can change with the advent of new
technologies. Suppose someone invents a lighthouse that casts an invisible
"light" as a warning, a light that took the fonn of, for example, infrared,
ultraviolet, radio-frequency, or some other non-visible beam or signal in
place of ordinary light. This new signal would, let us say, be detectable
only with a special kind of receiving apparatus. Ships with these special
receivers would detect the lighthouse signals and be warned of the dangers
of shoals and shallows; ships without the receivers would have no way of
detecting the warnings.
The lighthouse industry could then stop worrying about selling
subscriptions to lighthouse services-industry members would only need
to sell the special receiving apparatus. As tangible, discrete objects, these
receivers would not be public goods at all, but on the contrary, fully private
goods, from whose benefits free riders could easily be excluded. If ships
did not buy a receiver, they would not be able to take advantage of the
lighthouse warnings.)4
Technology can change things in the opposite way as well, of course.
Suppose now that someone discovers that with a piece of paper and a
paperclip, one can easily modify an ordinary radio receiver so that the

n Interestingly, there is evidence that lighthouse entrepreneurs can find ways around the public
goods dilemma. See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW, 187 (1988) (leaving lighthouse light as much less of a public good than might first be
thought).
4

J Those who know ton law will recognize strong parallels with Learned Hand's opinion in The
TJ. Hooper case, where Hand held that a tugboat was negligent for not being equipped with a radio
receiver that would pick up weather forecasts. See T. J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1932).
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ordinary radio becomes capable of detecting the special lighthouse signals.
A special receiving apparatus would therefore no longer be required. If
this inexpensive paperclip technology became common, it would constitute
a technological change that converted a formerly private good-the
expensive-to-receive-special-lighthouse signals-into a much more public
one for all the reasons initially cited, namely, the difficulty of exclusion,
and the "zero marginal cost" of additional use.

D. Market Level
The extent to which something is a public good can also ·vary depending
on the market level that one examines. The ease of excluding individual
consumers from using a good without paying for it may be different from
the ease of excluding another company from producing the good. For
example, ignoring intellectual property rules for a moment, we can see that
an individual who buys a hardback 400-page book at a bookstore will find
that it is expensive to reproduce a good quality copy of that book. To look
at the facts from the publisher's side, we could say that it is fairly easy for
a book publisher to exclude individual book buyers as potential free riders
from book sales.
For other publishing companies as opposed to
individuals, however, the picture may be quite different. Because they are
in the business of reproducing books, publishers can more easily undertake
the publishing process. 35 In the absence of any intellectual property laws,
original publishers would find it harder to exclude other publishers from
free riding than they would find it to be for individual consumers, leaving
us with the conclusion that the degree of "public goodness" for books may
be different when viewed at the wholesale level than when viewed at the
retail level.
In fact, if we confine ourselves to books at the retail level, we are hard
pressed to say that "books" are much of a public good at all. The actual
amount of free riding at this level of inquiry must surely be near zero.
Most people refuse to let even one other person "read over their shoulder,"
let alone a large group of people. To the extent that readers find it
unpleasant or undesirable for others to read over their shoulder, and to the

35

The actual cost of publishing and distributing would be the same whether it were initiated by a
publishing company itself, or by an individual who simply hired the publisher under contract. But the
transaction costs for the individual would include learning about publishers and negotiating with them,
plus the opponunity costs of the individual's time. By hypothesis, the individual is not already an
employee of a publishing company, so that the individual would have to take time from some other
occupation in order to deal with the .publishing process. I suspect that these latter costs (transaction
and opponunity) are significant.
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extent that there is not a lot of shoulder space in the "readable distance"
from a given book reader, we can see that most free riding readers are quite
easy to exclude. All that is necessary is for the original reader to tell others
"I don't want you reading over my shoulder; and besides, you're in my
space."
·
True, "books" as an abstraction are much more of a public good than "a
particular copy of a particular book~" For example, Alice can read "a
book" without taking away from Bob's ability to read "a book." But it is
not true as a practical matter that Alice and Bob can read the same copy of
the same book at the same time.
E. Horses, Copyrights, and Levels ofAbstraction

This last observation, that there is a big difference between looking at "a
particular copy of a particular book" and looking at the more general
category of"books," brings up another crucial point. Not only do different
"market levels" affect the degree to which something is or is not a public
good, but so does the level of abstraction or level of generality on which
we focus. "A particular copy of a particular book" is something from
which free riders can easily be excluded, or alternatively put, something for
which the marginal cost of additional over-the-shoulder readers is more
than zero. But "books" as an abstract, general category are much more
"public" on the public goods spectrum, both because readers of "books"
could find it quite difficult to stop other readers from reading "books," and
also because the marginal cost imposed on one reader of "books" from the
fact of others also reading "books" is indeed zero.
That observation brings us back around to this: If Bob gives Alice his
copy of a book, Bob can no longer possess or read that particular copy of
the book. Of course, he can buy another copy of the book and read that
one-but then, so can John Perry Barlow buy another horse and ride that
one. 36 In other words, the common view that "information" can be
distributed or shared without depriving the owner of that same information
is true, but it is only true if we look at "information" in the abstract, as a
generalization that ignores the actual medium in which the information is
recorded.
To be sure, if you buy a book with soine facts in it and you learn those
facts, you can give away or sell the book and still possess the facts. But

36

See supra text accompanying note 9.
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"facts" are not copyrightable anyway, 37 so the "shareability" of facts has no
implication one way or another for intellectual property laws. More to the
point is that if you buy a 400 page novel, read it, and then give it away, you
will not likely remember all the words and be able to "re-read" the novel in
your mind. And of course, this same observation holds true with movies
on video cassette, music COs, and the like.
Many works that
unquestionably contain or consist of copyrightable "information" like
music, movies, or computer software can be enjoyed or used as. a practical
matter only if one possesses the physical object that records them. Such
tangible objects constitute limited, scarce resources in just the same way
that horses and loaves of bread do. In thinking about "public goods" and
intellectual property, then, we would be remiss not to be clear about the
level of abstraction or generality that we are discussing. The more ·general
'the ·.level of our examination of informational works, the more like a
"public good" such works will seem. On the other hand, the more we zero
in on some particular copy of some particular informational work, the less
like a public good that work will seem.
The real difference between "a horse" or "a loaf of bread" or "a
toothbrush" on the one hand, and "information" or "knowledge" on the
other, is not the difference between tangible and intangible things, as is
commonly asserted. Rather it is the difference between a "particular
object," and a "generalization about objects." "A horse" is an object.
"Information" is not an object or comparable to an object, but is rather a
generalized label-an abstraction, more of a concept than a thing. We can
now see that when Barlow spoke of the difference between knowledge and
a horse, he was focusing on a single, particular horse: "If I sell you my
horse, I can't ride him after that." And it is true that if the owner of a
single, particular horse sells that horse, the (former) owner can no longer
ride that horse. But it is not true that if Barlow sells you "a" horse, he
cannot thereafter ride "a" horse. It just requires a different horse. In other
words, if we raise the subject of our inquiry from a particular instance
drawn from a larger category, to that of the larger category itself--from a
particular horse to a more generalized category, such as "horses" or
"animals" or "means of transportation"-then Barlow's observation about
selling horses is no longer true.
In exactly the same way, commentators who talk about the shareability
of "information" are keeping the topic of discussion at a high level of
generality. But to the extent that commentators compare intellectual

37
See 17 U.S.C. §102 (1994) (giving protection to "original works of authorship," and long
interpreted as denying copyright to "facts" as such). See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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property or "infonnation" in general to tangible property by using
particular instances of particular kinds of tangible property, then they, like
Barlow, are comparing apples to oranges with results that are meaningless.
If we want to compare "apples to apples" in the context of horses and
infonnation, then we will need to put our tenns on a continuum from "most
abstract or general" to "most concrete or particular;" we might first think
along these lines:
•
•
•

"Transportation" is to "information" as
"Horses" are to "books" and as
"A particular horse" is to "a particular copy of a particular
novel."

Even that comparison though, needs a final adjustment. Intellectual
property protection like that of copyright law, the real subject of our
inquiry, does not apply to "a particular copy of a particular novel" or to any
other tangible fixation of a type of work. Part of the genius of copyright
law is that its subject matter is defined to be an abstraction: copyright
protects "a literary work," not ''a book." It applies to "an audio-visual
work," not to "a reel of film." Copyright's "works" are abstractions that
can be fixed in any sort of medium. Fixation of some sort is a requirement
of copyright's protection. 38 Once fixed, the "thing" given protection is not
the fixation itself but rather the abstract work embodied in the fixation. If
we are to draw any conclusions about the subject matter of copyright law
as a kind of public good, and distinguish that subject matter from the
tangible objects in which such works might be fixed, then we need to
amend the continuum shown above, more or less like this:
•
•
•

"Transportation" is to "information" as
"Horses" are to "books" (or perhaps "novels"), and as
"A particular horse" is to ''the copyright in a particular novel."

Listing the comparison in this way shows plainly why the proposition
that "infonnation is a public good" is flawed and meaningless: if you give
away your horse, you cannot ride him after that. But it is also hornbook
law that if you give away your copyright rights, you cannot exercise them
after that.
Once we make the comparisons in this .more accurate fashion, coming
closer to apples to apples instead of apples to oranges/9 we can see that it is
38

39

See 17 U.S.C. § 102.

Readers may well disagree over what is the precisely right, accurate, or best comparison.
Should it be "horses" to "'books?"' Or should it be "horses" to "novels?" Or "horses" to "literary
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no more (or less) accurate to say things like "intellectual property laws
confer a monopoly over or restrict the sharing of infonnation,"40 than it is
to say that "personal property ownership laws confer a monopoly over or
restrict the sharing of transportation." Personal property ownership simply
does not apply to the highly generalized category of "transportation." It
applies to particular objects like "horses" that make up that category. In
the same way, intellectual property ownership does not apply to the highly
generalized category of "information" either. It applies to particular
copyrighted works.
Indeed, if we were to say that "information" is a public good, then we
would be obliged to say also that "transportation" and "housing" and
"food" and "recreation" or many other high-level, abstract categories are
also "public goods." One can, after all, make use of "transportation"
without depriving others of the ability to use "transportation." And if it
makes any sense to say that someone produces or provides "transportation"
in the abstract, then it would certainly be difficult for that producer or
provider to exclude others from using "transportation" in that same abstract
sense.
In sum, if asserted differences between intellectual property and tangible
property are offered to justify differences in the application of a propertylike legal regime to both things, the actual absence of those differences
takes away any such justification. If it turns out, as I have shown here it
does, that "horses" and "books," or "horses" and "copyrights," are very
much alike, then there is no argument concerning "public goods" that
would cause us to treat them differently in our legal system.
In other words, for purposes of applying property ownership laws,
"intellectual property" and "tangible property" are no different whatever.
copyrights?" Or "four-legged beasts of burden" to "short stories?" My argument does not rest,
however, on agreement over the best comparison. It is sufficient for me to show two things: that "a
particular horse" compared to the abstract category of "infonnation" is plainly the wrong comparison
for the reasons explained in the text, and that "a copyright right," once given away or sold, cannot
thereafter be exercised by its fonner owner, just as is true with ownership over tangible objects.
40
The number of references in the legal literature to copyright as a "monopoly" is staggering.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. lSI, 156 (1975); Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591
(1917); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Fonotopia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 959 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 189 (quoting MACAULAY, supra note 18); Wendy J. Gordon, On
Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 18 VA. L. REv. 149, 157
( 1992); Mark. A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing.
87 CAL. L. REv. Ill, 170 (1999) (stating: "(i]ntellectual property is a deliberate, governmentsponsored departure from the principles of free competition, designed to subsidize creators and
therefore to induce more creation."); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in II
ENCYC. L. & ECON., supra note IS at 129, 131; Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II
ENCYC. L. & ECON., supra note I 5 at 189, 194.
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IV. WHAT ABOUT DIGITAL MATERIALS?

One often hears that the problem with digital materials (things that can
be stored and handled by computers) and copyright law is that unlike noncomputerized things, such as books, paintings, and audio cassette tapes,
digital materials can be perfectly copied with the press of a button. lsn 't
that what makes the challenge of the Internet era for copyright law so
extraordinarily, even unprecedentedly, difficult? In a word, "no."
First of all, there has to be something more to the issues of digital
materials than just the bare observation that they are "easy to copy." That
phrase describes a whole lot of copying of copyrightable things, including
the photocopying of magazine articles, the dubbing of audio tapes, and
more. To a great extent, ttie whole raison d'etre. pf copyright law is that all
copyrightable materials would otherwise be too ''easy to copy" relative to
the difficulty of their creation.
The problem of digital materials must be more the fact that such
materials are much easier to copy than to create. In fact, they can be
copied with a perfection thought to be lacking in the world of non-digital
materials like books and cassette tapes. Or to put it another way, we care
about two things when we think about copyright and the copying of works
of authorship: one is the cost of copying (where "cost" includes not only
out of pocket monetary costs, but also time, trouble, nuisance, and skill)
and the other is the quality of the resulting copy. Perhaps a medieval
scribe could make an extraordinarily high quality copy of an illuminated
manuscript, one that was equal or even better than the original, but the cost
of making such a copy-the laborious and tedious handwork-was
exceedingly high. No wonder the medieval age did not bother with
copyright laws! 41
But today's digital era might be considered profoundly new because
making copies of digital works exhibits a more favorable cost-to-quality
ratio (namely, perfect quality to nearly zero cost) than we see in the nondigital world.
The idea of "perfection" of copies refers to the fact that with most nondigital materials, multiple generations of copies results in steadily lower

41
Western European copyright law is generally thought to be the outgrowth ofCaxton's printing
press, introduced to England in 1476, an invention that sharply lowered the cost of making copies. See
generally, LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1968). The
medieval period saw something akin to copyright in the widely accepted right of the owner of a
manuscript to grant or deny others permission to copy; but this right appears to be based almost
entirely on possession of the tangible object alone, without any relationship to whether the owner was
the "author" or not. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 9 (1993) citing GEORGE HAVEN
PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 481-483 ( 1896-97).
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quality. A typical non-digital work would be a cassette tape with music
recorded on it. When that tape is copied, the quality of the second tape is
lower than that of the original tape. Engineers would say that the signal-tonoise ratio goes down: there is more of what we do not want to hear, and
less of what we do. If that second tape is itself copied, the quality of the
third tape will be even l.ower. The same thing happens when you
photocopy a page of text: the first copy is likely to be quite clear, but a
second one will be a little worse, a third one even worse, and so on. Each
generation of copies is inferior to the one that preceded it.
But take a digital work like a computer program residing on a
computer's hard disk. If it can be copied at all, the copy will not have
degraded in the slightest, but will be exactly like the original in every
way-a perfect substitute for the original. Second and third and fourth
generation copies will also be perfect substitutes. With digital works, in
other words, repeated copying does not, at least for all practical purposes,
seem to change the signal-to-noise ratio at all.
All of these assertions-that digital copies can be made with perfection,
that multiple generations remain perfect, that the copying costs for digital
works are ess~ntially zero--are often put forward to show that digital and
non-digital works are radically different. 42 As with the asserted differences
between tangible and intangible things, all the assertions about digital and
non-digital materials in fact miss the mark. For purposes of copyright law,
the perfection of copies is not the point. The point is the cost of making a
copy of adequate quality, that is, the cost of making a substitutable,
saleable copy.43
As in the example of the photocopies and audio cassette tapes mentioned
already, non-digital copies seem to "go downhill" rapidly in quality. But
just how rapidly depends not only on the non-digital nature of the medium,
but also on the quality and sophistication of ~he recording equipment used
in making both the original and the copies. Very high quality non-digital
recording equipment may be able to make several more generations of
useful copies of an audio tape than lower quality equipment. If these
higher quality copies are adequate for one's purposes and inexpensive, they

42
See, e.g., OFFICE Of TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, fiNDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE Of TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 170 (1992) (discussing
"major differences between digital information and information in more traditional forms" and citing
Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323-40 (1990)).
43

Cf AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY Of COPYRIGHT IN
BOOKS 16 (1899) (stating "it is as easy to print from a copy as from the original, makes no real
difference in the nature of the right, though it may make it more difficult of enforcement.").
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can be "perfect enough" to be substituted for the original copy even though
both original and all copies are in non-digital form.
As usual, when the "quality" of something is at issue, it is often possible
to obtain a higher quality result by spending more money. If we wanted a
very high quality copy of a vinyl record album, for example, we might hire
a group of NASA scientists44 to do the job. They might use laser beams to
trace around the curving sound tracks, along with digital. sound filtering
and editing to discard scratches, hiss, and other imperfections, and perhaps
even end up with a copy that was superior to the original vinyl record.
Multiple generations of copies would not, of course, get steadily better, but
it might be possible to make quite a lot of generations of copies preserving
more than adequate sound-<:opies that would be good market substitutes
for the original. It would not be ''impossible" to do so because of the nondigital nature of the original-it would just be expensive to do so.
An even better example to make this point-namely that the quality of
copies is related to cost, not to the fact of being digital or non-digital-is
material in textual form, such as books. Readers should ask themselves this
question: Can a book-a traditional, non-digital, paper-and-ink-book-be
perfectly copied, copy after copy after copy? Of course it can. All that is
necessary is to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Re-type or scan the text.
Proof-read it,
Re-format it with word processing,
Re-print it,
Cut the sheets to size,
Re-bind it, and ...
The result is a perfect copy.

It is not the technology of non-digital, paper-and-ink books that keeps
anyone from making perfect copies of books, or copies of copies of books.
It is, rather, the cost.
The implication of this observation-that the difference between digital
and non-digital works relates almost entirety to reproduction costs an~
quality, not to anything inherent in their respective technologies-for
tomorrow's copyright issues is enormous. The implication is simply, but
profoundly, this:

44

"NASA scientists" is used here as a fonnal tenn for the infonnal category of archetypically well
qualified persons, namely "rocket scientists."'
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Assuming that the cost-to-quality ratio for copying non-digital works
remainS COnStant,4S anything that has the effect Of lowering (that is,
improving) the cost-to-quality ratio for copying digital works will have the
effect of increasing the difference between digital and non-digital works.
As a corollary: anything that has the effect of raising the cost-to-quality
ratio for copying digital works has the effect of reducing the differences
between such a digital work and the same work in non-digital form.
Finally, it follows that if the cost of duplicating a digital work reaches
the same level as that for duplicating the same work in non-digital form at
the same level of quality, then far from being radically different, for
copyright purposes the digital and the non-digital editions will be, and
should be treated as, exactly the same.
·
Now we need to ask: what could change those cost-to-quality ratios for
digital works? The general answer is "almost anything," including changes
in the applicable legal regime, in technology, in business models, in
contractual agreements, in the state of the computing art, or in anything
else.
·
A. Technological Change
Let us take technology as an example. How could a change in
technology change the cost of copying digital works? To ask the question
draws our attention to a host of activities being undertaken all around us.
Many new technologies, such as encryption, digital watermarks, digital
object containers, proprietary viewers, and the like, serve to raise the cost
of unauthorized copies. Encryption, for example, makes it harder-hence
more "costly"-to make unauthorized copies of digital works. For
ordinary users who are not computer scientists or mathematicians or clever
hackers, the cost of making an unau!horized copy of an encrypted work
will likely be "infinite," making those works in a sense even "more nondigital" than non-digital works. Most people at least understand how a
book could be copied, even if they do not want to undertake the copying
themselves; whereas I doubt that most people have any understanding
whatsoever of how an encryption algorithm could be broken. For such

4

s If the cost-to-quality ratio for copying non-digital works does not remain constant, then any
such change will introduce another variable. We would have to compare two ratios to complete the
analysis in the text: a changing cost-to-quality ratio for copying digital works, compared to a changing
cost-to-quality ratio for copying non-digital works. This added variable makes the analysis seem more
complicated, but does not change the results or my point, so I have made the simplifYing assumption
in the text.
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people, it would be cheaper to copy a paper book than to copy an encrypted
digital book.
B. Business Models

Another thing that can change the cost-to-quality ratio for copying
digital works is the use of different business practices or "business
models." To understand how business practices can have such an effect,
we should first broaden our notion of what we mean by the cost-to-quality
ratio for copying works. If you think about it, we do not just care about
that ratio as a single factor. We also care about how that factor differs for
making authorized and unauthorized copies, for the cost-to-quality ratio of
copying may well not be the same for the one as it is for the other. For
example, suppose that the cost to individuals of making an adequate
unauthorized copy of some copyrighted work is low relative to the
resulting quality of the copy-that is, suppose such copying exhibits a very
favorable cost-to-quality ratio. Nevertheless, if that same ratio for making
an authorized copy is more favorable still, most individuals will be
encouraged to pay the cost of making the authorized copy.
We can put this notion in the context of a real-world example.
Technology does not prevent anyone f.-om making a copy of a National
Geographic magazine. Color photocopiers now exist that will provide a
reasonably good quality copy at a pretty reasonable price. Magazine issues
are not "encrypted" or otherwise scrambled or encoded. In lieu of
photocopying, one could also digitally scan each page and print new pages
on a color printer, using high-gloss paper. No matter how favorable the
cost-to-quality ratio of such copies proves to be, it is almost certain that the
cost-to-quality ratio would be more favorable still for just buying another
(authorized) copy of the magazine. Why scan and print each page to make
a copy if you can buy another original-an authorized copy-for less?
Could this same situation occur in the digital world? Certainly it
could-there is no particular requirement with digital works that their
authorized copying (or use) always be priced "very high." The price of
anything is a function of many things, including supply and demand, which
in tum depend on production costs, perceived value, and so on. Nothing in
economics or common sense tells us, however, that the "price" of a work
or product is a function of whether that work or product is "digital" or
"non-digital." That observation implies that if the price of making an
authorized copy of some digital work is quite low, we might find, as with
the National Geographic example, that it is cheaper to obtain an authorized
copy than to make an unauthorized one.
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The development of "micro-payments" is one way to reduce the .cost or
price of making authorized copies of digital materials. "Micro payments"
is just a buzz word for the practice of dividing up a digital work into fairly
small "pieces" for which billing is handled separately. For example, if a
web site were to charge users to view its pages, it might charge something
like half-a-penny per page viewed. Such a charge might feel like a great
nuisance to the viewer (although very likely the charges would be
accumulated or aggregated before the user actually rendered payment), but
on the other hand, trying to hack around the web site's login and password
system might be an even bigger nuisance-not worth the trouble just to
··
avoid a half cent charge.
By sharply lowering the cost of authorized uses of copyrighted works,
micro payments serve to make the cost of unauthorized uses relatively
much larger. Hence, such payment schemes serve to increase the (relative)
cost of copyright infringement and therefore to reduce the amount and
extent of such infringements. If the relative cost of unauthorized-toauthorized uses for some particular digital work happens to coincide with
that same ratio for the work in its non-digital form, then once again, for
copyright purposes, there is no longer any difference between the nondigital and digital works whatsoever.
C. Penalties and Fines
Technologies like encryption and payment systems like micro-payments
are only two of many things that also affect the cost-to-quality ratio of
making unauthorized copies of digital works. Another obvious "cost" for
making unauthorized copies is that of paying a fine. If making an
unauthorized copy costs, $1 0 out-of-pocket, but inevitably will be
accompanied by a court-imposed fine46 of$100, then the cost of making the
copy is not really $10, it is $110. To be sure, most court fines (especially,
perhaps, for making unauthorized copies in small numbers) are not in any
realistic sense "inevitable." No doubt many people make unauthorized
copies of computer software without ever being caught, let alone paying a
fine, but that just means that the "expected" cost of the fine is not the
amount of the fine itself. It is the amount of the fine multiplied by-or
"discounted" by-the likelihood of ever having to pay the fine.
Suppose the likelihood of having to pay a given fine for making an
unauthorized copy of some digital work is only one percent. That is, of

46

ufine."

I include "coun imposed damage payments for infringement" in the conveniently shoner word
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every one hundred cases of unauthorized copying, only one person will be
caught and have to pay the fine. If the fine is $1 00, then the real "cost" of
the fine to any one person is about (.0 I) times ($1 00), or one dollar. If the
likelihood of having to pay the fine is only one in a thousand cases, then
the real "cost" is (.001) times ($100), or ten cents. That means that when
we compare the cost-to-quality ratio of making unauthorized copies to
making authorized copies, we should include as part of the "cost" of the
unauthorized copies the possibility of having to pay a fine.
Could anything in the digital world change the expected cost of such a
fine, or make it closer to the same cost for making authorized copies?
Certainly it could. For one thing, making authorized copies carries no
"cost" in the fonn of a possible fine at all. Even a small risk of a small fine
is some cost. As soon as we realize that there is nothing inherent in digital
materials that requires fines to be "small" for unauthorized copying, we see
that these costs can in fact be anything that Congress or a court imposes.
There is no technological reason and there is nothing inherent in the nature
Qf digital materials, for example, that would prevent Congress from
imposing a fine of $100 million for making an unauthorized copy of a
digital work. An unauthorized copy of the same type of work in non..,
digital fonn could carry a much lower fine. To be sure, there may be good
political reasons that Congress would not choose to impose such a fine, but
political reasons are political reasons, not reasons of technology, and more
to the point, they are reasons that have nothing to do with whether a work
is digital or non-digital.
For that matter, raising the fine on unauthorized copies is not the only
way that the differences between non-digital and digital works could be
eliminated. Remember that the real "cost" of a fine is a result of two
things: the fine itself, and the chance of having to pay the fine. 47 If
Congress chose not to make the size of a fine large enough that the
expected cost of infringement for digital works was equal to or slightly
higher than the cost of making non-infringing, authorized copies, then
perhaps Congress--or technology or business model or anything elsecould change the likelihood of any unauthorized copier's ever having to
pay the fine.
What could do that? Anything that lowered the cost of detecting the
existence of, and enforcing rights against, unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works could do that. Many people assume that detection and enforcement
of copyrights are nearly impossible with digital works because the Internet
47

See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 16 J. PoL. ECON. 169
(1968). See also A. MITCHELL PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-79 (2d ed.
1989). I am ignoring other factors such as the degree of risk aversion.
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more or less "automatically" decentralizes48 every use of every digital
work. With millions of computers connected to the Internet in millions of
locations, how can a copyright owner ever hope to discover, let alone
enforce rights against, potentially millions of dispersed and unauthorized
users of copyrighted works?
But here again, this possibility-that unauthorized uses will be too
dispersed and decentralized .to be detected-is not something that is
inherent in the Internet itself; rather it is a function of various technologies.
The ability to "detect" something is itself partly a matter of those
technologies. If one technology (say, "the Internet") arises that allows the
dispersal of activities like copying, there is every reason to assume that
other technologies can also arise that will haye the effect of making it
easier to detect unauthorized uses.
Indeed, one such technology for detection is the Internet itselfl Look at
it this way. Is it easier to study what goes on in one thousand homes
suspected of copyright infringement around the world, or to study what
goes on with one thousand web sites suspected of copyright infringement
around the world? I would say the latter-they are much easier to examine
remotely, and it is less offensive to do so. In fact, the Recording Industry
Association of America has already begun routinely scouring the web with
automatic "robots" (software programs) that look for files containing
unauthorized copies of digitized music. 49 Other companies search regularly
for digitized photographic images that contain watermarks belonging to a
given owner to see if the images are in fact in their rightful hands. 5° Of

48

For an extended discussion of "decentralization" as it relates to copyright law, see I. TROTTER
HARDY, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 240, 259-76 ( 1998).
49

New means have also developed to police the unauthorized duplication and dissemination of
digitized music and video over the Internet. "New encryption technologies have been developed, such
as digital watermarking and fingerprinting, which substantiate ownership and prevent unauthorized
copying." Robert G. Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, The Legal War Against Cyberspace Privacy, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1999, at 3. Monitoring services utilizing specially tailored search technology scour the Web
for sites containing music files.
For instance, Broadcast Music Inc.'s [BMI) Music Bot is an automated monitoring system,
which searches for unauthorized use of its members' music. The American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers employs software to locate sites containing the music
of its members. Upon finding on-line infringers, rights holders may issue licenses or pursue
the infringers with cease-and-desist letters and infringement actions.

/d. (footnotes omitted). See also Erich Boehm, Online O.fftrack At Midem, VARIETY, Feb. I, 1999Feb. 7, 1999, at 20.
50

·See. e.g., Digimarc MarcSpider® Image Tracking Service (visited Dec. 5, 2000)
<http://www .digimarc.com/imaginglprspider.htm>.
"Digimarc® MarcSpider image tracking
technology crawls the most highly trafficked public areas of the world wide Web, searching for
Digimarc-watermarked images and reporting back details about when and where they are found." /d.
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course, countervailing strategies and technologies can be (and are)
developed to avoid or fool these robots, but that fact only reaffinns this
more important fact: the state of technology at a given time detennines
how easy it is to detect unauthorized copying.
That technology can change over time, and is doing so now. In a world
of such rapidly changing technology, it makes no more sense to say that
"digital technology" and "the Internet" make detection of infringements
hard, than it does to say that "non-digital technology" makes detection of
infringements easy.
In sum, for copyright purposes, the significant difference betWeen any
two works is the difference in their ratios of cost-to-quality for
reproduction, not whether the fonnat of the works is digital or non-digital.
A great many constantly changing factors, including technology and the
law, can alter those cost-to-quality ratios. When those ratios change for
different versions of works, the result may be that the works exhibit greater
copyright differences or greater copyright similarities--but in neither case
will the differences in ratios have any necessary relationship to whether the
works are digital or not. Thus, there are no inherent differences between
digital and non-digital works as far as copyright law is concerned. In a
time of rapid technological change, copyright law should not be based on
any other assumption.
V.

WHAT ABOUT BALANCING?

The topic of this symposium is Copyright's Balance in an Internet
Wor/d. I understand the idea of "balance" to refer to the adjustment of the
relative rights of copyright "producers" and copyright "consumers," groups
whose interests are presumptively at odds 51 ~lse there would be no need
to "balance" them. Indeed, the notion of balance is often intertwined with

Sl Accord, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 187-88 (stating that policymakers
must consider ~I) what rights in information products and services should be granted to a proprietor
and 2) what rights should be retained by the public...."); Lemley, supra note 18, at 128 (stating:
"(c]opyright law contains a number of compromises between the desires of authors and those of the
consuming public."); Neil Weinstock Netanel. Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996) (beginning the article by noting that "[c]opyright law strikes a precarious balance");
David Nimmer, A Riff On Fair Use In The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673,
681-82 (2000) (noting: "it is essential to appreciate Congress's concern with balancing the interests of
copyright proprietors. on the one hand, against the interests of the community of users, scholars,
equipment manufacturers, and on-line service providers, on the other."); Brad King, Copyright Act
Test,
WIRED
(Nov.
29,
2000),
Faces
Big
<http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,40378,00.html> (noting that "[a]t issue is whether
the DMCA has properly balanced consumers' rights with copyright-holders' interests since its
inception two years ago.").
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an assumption that it is Congress, the maker of copyright law, that is the
only entity appropriately situated to effect the proper balance between
copyright producers and consumers. Much of the "balance" debate
currently centers therefore on whether Congress has already appropriately
balanced those interests by enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act52 or the Audio Home Recording Act 53 or in other enactments; or
whether it has created a lop-sided balance in those and similar
enactments; 54 or whether changing technology itself has already shifted the
balance to a lop-sided state that Congress should now rectify.
All such questions reflect a starting presumption, that Congress should
draw a balance between the rights of producers and the rights of consumers
in the context of copyright law. Debate seems to start at that point and go
forward. But the presumption itself needs to be questioned more closely.
Why is it that "Congress" must draw the appropriate balance? We do not,
after all, say that Congress should draw the appropriate balance between
the interests of "toothbrush producers" and "toothbrush consumers." We
assume rather that producers and consumers will reach a largely marketdriven balance without much ado by Congress. If tangible objects like
toothbrushes can be handled by creating an initial property-like right in
toothbrushes, without further involvement by Congress, why is it that
"copyright rights" are different? Why is it not the case that after the initial
creation of some sort of property-like rights in works of authorship,
Congress can withdraw and leave a balance to be achieved by the ordinary
transactions between producers and consumers that happen millions of
times each day outside the copyright context in the realm of tangible
objects?
One answer might be that intellectual property is different from tangible
property. But insofar as this difference is thought to be based on concepts
of externalities and public goods, that answer is precisely what this essay
refutes. Copyright protection is what overcomes those differences and
corrects what would otherwise be market failures. Another answer might
52

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. chap. 12 (YEAR)).
53

Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. chap. I 0 (YEAR)).
54

See, e.g., Windy City Wrap-up, AMERICAN LIBRARIES, Sept. I, 2000 (covering the American
Library Association's annual meeting in July, 2000).
Copyright specialist Carrie Russell of ALA's Office for Information Technology Policy said
the DMCA has created a 'muddled and problematic' environment for libraries since it was·
signed into law two years ago (AL, Nov. 1998, p. 16). [Russell called] the Jaw a 'dramatic
shift in copyright policy' that tips the balance in favor of the copyright holders ....
Jd
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be that digital and non-digital works are inherently different, and the
evolution of digital technology has affected copyright rights to such an
extent that additional intervention by Congress is essential. Again, this
essay refutes that notion almost entirely, with the exception that Congress
has a possible role in increasing the fines on digital materials-but even
here, only if one thinks that infringement of such materials will always be
harder to detect than infringement of non-digital materials, an assumption
that I do not myself share.
Another answer might take this form: Congress makes copyright law as
a matter of positive law, not natural rights. If authors have no natural
rights, and Congress makes copyright law, then Congress can establish or
terminate, expand or contract, those rights in whatever ways and for
whatever reasons it sees fit.
This latter argument is that Congress is empowered to make whatever
decisions it wants to make, any time it wants to make them, about the
scope and extent of copyright rights. If my initial presumption about the
role of collective versus individual decision-making is valid, though, this
latter view gets it backwards. As I began this essay, I return now to the
observation that by United States tradition as well as the structure of the
Federal Constitution, decisions are presumptively made by individuals
unless a good argument can be made that a decision is better made
collectively. The burden of proving as a threshold matter that some form
of collectively-sanctioned intellectual property protection is a good idea
seems to be met by the threshold creation of intellectual property rights to
help overcome the basic quality of informational products as having
"positive externalities." Beyond that, further decisions about the scope and
extent of rights can be made by individuals in the form of contracts reached
through individual market transactions. There is no requirement or need
for Congress to be involved in any further balancing (and there are reasons
beyond those of"tradition" for it not to be). 55

ss An on-going process of congressional balancing is itself likely to be hannful, and so would
require especially strong justifications. A call for continued "balancing" in the copyright arena means
a call for Congress to continually re-evaluate the copyright rights of various parties. This in tum
entails considerable costs in the collective decision-making process, costs that property rights are
designed to prevent. See l. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 217, 255 (1996). Cass Sunstein has put the matter more strongly, at least in regard to
tangible property rights. (I cannot tell if he means to include intellectual property rights in his
discussion, or if not, whether he would agree that his same observations would apply to intellectual
property rights-though obviously I think that they do.)
(O]ne of the best ways to destroy a democratic system is to ensure that the distribution of
wealth and resources is unstable and constantly vulnerable to reevaluation by the political
process. A high degree of stability is necessary . . . to prevent the political process from
breaking down by attempting to resolve enormous, emotionally laden issues about who is
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Hence, the burden falls on its proponents to justify further Congressional
intervention in the form of balancing interests, and more particularly, to
justify the need for Congress to provide any balancing beyond the initial
provision of property-like rights whatsoever. I readily acknowledge that
arguments in favor of such an intervention can and will be made, and I
make no attempt here to address, let alone confirm or refute, such
arguments. I note only that the arguments cannot rest on the belief that
intangible property is inherently different from tangible property, or on the
belief that digital materials are inherently different from non-digital
materials.
VI. CONCLUSION

Is "intellectual property" different from ''tangible property?" No. The
usual arguments about these differences compare apples to oranges by
comparing general abstract categories such as "information" or
"knowledge" to far more particular instances of larger categories such as
"horses;" hence these comparisons reach faulty conclusions.
Are "digital materials" different from other forms of intellectual
authorship? No. The usual arguments ignore the role of cost and quality
of copying, and the role of both changing technology and of copyright law
itself in affecting that cost-to-quality ratio. If technology or copyright law
itself can raise the cost of making a digital reproduction of some work to
the same level as that for making a non-digital reproduction of comparable
quality, then there is no difference for copyright purposes between the
digital and non-digital formats.
Must Congress balance the interests of information producers and
information consumers? No. All that is necessary, to overcome the widely
recognized problem of positive externalities, is for Congress to create an
unadorned right of ownership in authors. A balance will thereafter
necessarily be drawn through individual market transactions. For Congress

entitled to what. ... A system in which property rights are open to continuous readjustment
will produce serious harm.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 210 (1997). An on-going Congressional
balancing of copyright interests is a system of continuous readjustment of property rights. Anyone
who has watched Congress deal with changes in the copyright law should agree that the process is one
of"resolv[ing) enormous, emotionally laden issues about who is entitled to what." Jd Additionally,
on-going re-adjustment of copyright rights usually implies a more complex copyright statute. This
complexity can also raise costs inasmuch as ~more detailed laws tend to be more costly for the
government to promulgate, for parties to interpret, and for enforcers to apply." Louis Kaplow, General
Characteristics of Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS V: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME
AND LITIGATION 502, 504 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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to become more deeply involved in the allocation of rights to copyrighted
material~to be more involved in a balancing of interests--calls for some
sort of justification. Many such justifications can doubtless be offered; this
essay demonstrates only that the notion of "public goods," or the notion
that there are inherent differences between tangible and intangible
property, or the notion that there are inherent differences between digital
and non-digital works, do not provide that justification.

